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Abstract 
Competition has been regarded as a positive phenomenon for banks; it is perceived that 
competition makes banks more efficient, stimulates financial innovation and open up new 
markets. Given the dynamic changes within the Indian banking system in the last two decades, it 
might be of interest to see whether the developments in the market structure correspond with less 
competitive behaviour or more on the part of market participants. For empirical assessment of 
the nature of competitive conditions amongst scheduled Indian commercial banks over a period 
of 15 years, we use the ‘Panzar-Rosser educed form revenue model’ to compute the so-called H 
statistic by estimating the factor price elasticities. It has been argued that if adjustment towards 
equilibrium is partial and not instantaneous, then static estimates of H statistic will be biased 
towards zero. Thus in this study alternative estimation techniques have been used for comparing 
the dynamic H-statistic with static H-statistic. The static H-statistic was found to have a 
downward bias. However, dynamic as well as static H-statistic, both pointed to the presence of 
monopolistic competition. The hypotheses of perfect collusion as well as of perfect competition 
can be rejected using dynamic as well as fixed panel-econometric model estimations using micro 
data of banks’ balance sheets and profit & loss accounts for the years 2000-2014. The division of 
the entire period into two sub-samples, i.e. before and after 2007 revealed a decrease in 
competition levels across the two periods. Although, empirical analysis supported the assertion 
that the nature of competition among the Indian Banks is monopolistic.But it showed a decrease 
in the level of competitionmay be due to consolidation exercises of top few large banks with 
smaller banks and also because of  the shift from traditional financial business to off-balance 
sheet activities, which might have lead to the convergence of competitive levels in the second 
sub-sample period, i.e. after 2007.The second sub-period also corresponds to the global financial 
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crisis of 2008, a possible reason for the lower H-statistic values. The low persistence of profit 
values (in the sub-periods) should be associated with higher competition, but in the case of the 
Indian banking sector, it may not be implausible to think that a low persistence of profit may 
arise from other sources than the only competition. It is also found that the values of competitive 
conduct (H-statistic), does not coincide with the classical concentration approach (CR5, CR10), 
for the Indian Banking Industry. The unit cost of funds, capital, and labour were found to be 
positive and statistically significant. The unit cost of funds was the highest contributor to the 
overall H statistic. The control variables, such as size and risk were found to be positively 
affecting the revenue. The findings arrived in this study; highlight the possible links between 
Indian banking sector competitiveness, profitability, intermediation and regulatory scenario. 
 
Keywords: Competition, Competitive Structure, Dynamic Model, Indian Banking Sector, 
Monopolistic Competition, Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, Profitability. 
JEL classification: D4, D53, E44, E58, G21, G28. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Indian Banking sector reforms were introduced as a broad counterpart of the economic 
reforms of 1991, which was aimed primarily at globalisation and liberalisation of the Indian 
Economy. Functioning of banks prior to the reforms was hampered by a decline in productivity, 
asset quality, and profitability. The reforms revamped the system providing a base for 
operational flexibility and functional autonomy which in turn improved their efficiency and 
stability. In addition to recapitalisation and restructuring of the banking system, another major 
element of the reforms was an enhancement in the competition within the market due to the free 
and liberal entry of new banks which adapt to the minimum start-up capital requirements as well 
as other requirements. The reforms embarked upon an enhancement of competition leading to 
new and innovative products across various categories. A second Committee on Banking Sector 
Reforms (1998) under Shri M. Narasimham was appointed to track and monitor the reforms 
initiated under the policy suggestions made in 1991.The committee, apart from enhancing the 
limit of start-up capital from $10 million to $25 million, pointed out that subsidiaries and Joint 
Ventures (JVs) to be treated at the same level as private banks. It also signalled towards the 
enhancement of competition and highlighted about plausible benefits of liberal entry for foreign 
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banks, opening of new private sector branches, and ingress of newer technological practices with 
a low level of Manpower requirements. 
In the past various, committees have been set up to examine the issue of structural changes in the 
banking system which had in generally favoured consolidation and the creation of well 
capitalised and more technology-oriented banks. Private Banks and foreign banks have been able 
to make their presence felt through active participation, which has fostered healthy competitive 
environment. 
To conform to global standards, RBI adopted a two-track gradualist approach wherein on one 
side it focused on the consolidation process of domestic banks and on another side, it set the 
track for increased presence of foreign banks in a phased manner. To this end, in 2005 RBI 
unveiled a “Roadmap for the presence of Foreign Banks in India” under which foreign banks 
could set up foreign branches or set up wholly owned subsidiaries, and the limit on the number 
of branches was also proposed to be set higher than that stipulated by WTO. 
In a report by OECD 2011,  “Competition Issues in the Financial Sector," it has been stated 
equivocally that by nature, contestable markets are extremely competitive. However, entry 
barriers exist within financial markets in the form of minimum regulatory requirements, branch 
licensing and restrictions on the entry of foreign firms. As with context to the Indian Banking 
Sector, barriers exist mainly on the capital requirements for new banks, the information 
asymmetry and geographic restrictions. 
Historically, competition has been considered to be a favorable phenomenon for most industries. 
With respect to banks, it is believed that competition makes banks more efficient and stimulates 
financial innovation and opening new markets (Bikker and Leuvenstein, 2014). In old view, 
competition is the main driver of economic growth and social welfare, as it also promotes 
efficiency and increases the risk-takingcapacity of banks. A certain level of competition is 
usually perceived to be desirable to increase the efficiency to provide financial services. A 
vigorous competition among banks can stimulate to improve the availability of products to 
consumers, their pricing and quality, and also promote financial innovation by using more 
modern updated techniques and skills. 
Competition among banks is a topic of interest for academicians as well as supervisors. The 
importance of the competition lies in the fact that it affects the financing and the availability of 
services to the market, as well as households, which eventually will have an impact on the 
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product and service quality. An inefficient banking sector with less competition affects the 
deposit decisions and hinders the resource allocation, which disrupt the economic development 
and the investment activity (Giustiniani & Ross, 2008). The last fifteen years, from 2000 to 2014 
may be called as the post-reform period (Narasimham Committee reforms-II, 1998), was 
embarked by various facets of change. Some of changes have been initiated by Reserve Bank of 
India itself, especially relating to branch licensing and foreign banks' entry. The last decade has 
also seen a decrease in the market share of the state-controlled banks, along with the entry of 
private and foreign banks in the industry. During our period of analysis, the global market was 
shuddered by one of the major shocks of the financial crisis 2008, out of which the Indian banks 
emerged relatively unscathed. It will be of interest to see the intensity as well as a change in the 
degree of competition during crisis and across sub-periods. Indian Banking Industry underwent 
structural and regulatory changes in the last two decades. Whether these developments in the 
market structure lead to a lesser competitive behaviour or more, on the part of market contestants 
needs to be analysed. Factor price elasticity can be estimated from the banks’ reduced form 
revenue model. The sum of these estimated factor price elasticity, which constitutes the H 
statistic, provide information about banks’ competitive behaviour. 
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Table 1 presents concentration ratios CR(5) and CR(10) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices 
CR(5) = Concentration Ratio of top five banks 
CR(10) = Concentration Ratio of top ten banks 
The CR(5) values of the top five banks (based on the asset size) have been decreasing over the 
years. The concentration of Top 5 banks based on their asset values were almost half the total 
market share (47%) during the early period of the sample. However, it shows a decreasing trend 
over the years which may loosely indicate the increasing degree of competition. The results of 
CR (10) show a similar decreasing trend over the years with the values ranging from 63% to 
57%. Similarly, the values of the HHI index show a decreasing trend over the years. All these 
statistics point out towards an increasing degree of competition over the sample period. 
The contestability theory argues that in the presence of free market entry and exit, the threat of 
entry alone can make competitive conduct independent of the number of firms actually acting in 
Year HHI CR(5) CR(10) 
2000 878.5 0.478 0.631 
2001 900.7 0.476 0.620 
2002 804.2 0.460 0.622 
2003 750.9 0.445 0.604 
2004 680.5 0.428 0.586 
2005 631.5 0.415 0.576 
2006 587.4 0.414 0.574 
2007 554.1 0.404 0.560 
2008 546.0 0.392 0.553 
2009 579.1 0.391 0.561 
2010 547.4 0.378 0.562 
2011 541.9 0.381 0.569 
2012 515.9 0.377 0.565 
2013 522.3 0.377 0.565 
2014 528.2 0.384 0.572 
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the market. As per the efficiency hypothesis, the market concentration may be a result of the 
strategic decision of the more efficient firms for increasing their market share rather than to 
exploit their efficiency advantages at the original market share and price level. Both the theories 
do not support a conclusion about competitive conduct in a market merely because of a higher 
degree of observed market concentration. 
 
Background Analysis 
The development in banking sector of India hasbeen broadly divided into three phases – 
1. The pre-independence phase 
2. The pre-liberalization& post-independence phase 
3. The post-liberalization phase 
The activities of borrowing and lending money in India have been there since the Vedic period, 
approximately four thousand years back, as per the Central Banking Enquiry Committee (1931). 
There isevidence of the presence of formal banking network and infrastructure in 500BC. It has 
been noted by the member of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, that the 
thriving trade and commerce have necessitated the adoption and development of the banking 
sector in India across the ages. As per Kautiliya’s famed book Arthashastra, during the 400BC, 
there were proper norms for the banking sector at that time. It also mentions about the practice of 
lending and borrowing, which makes the basic of the banking sector. Based on the evidence, 
until the point of time, India gained independence, there was a lack of a formal, organized and 
connected banking system. The lack of an organized banking sector also implied many players or 
many competitors, in the form of trade guilds or temples or the moneylenders, in the market. The 
mention of bank rates and norms implied some amount of regulation even during that point in 
time. 
Table 2 shows the list of Mergers and Acquisitions in the Indian Banking Industry since 
Liberalization 
Sr. 
No 
Name of Transferor Bank / 
Institution 
Name of Transferee Bank / 
Institution 
Date of 
Amalgamation 
1 Bank of Bihar Ltd State Bank of India November 8, 1969 
2 National Bank of Lahore Ltd State Bank of India February 20, 1970 
3 Miraj State Bank Ltd Union Bank of India July 29, 1985 
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4 Lakshmi Commercial Bank Ltd Canara Bank August 24, 1985 
5 Bank of Cochin Ltd State Bank of India August 26, 1985 
6 Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd Punjab National Bank December 19,1986 
7 Traders Bank Ltd Bank of Baroda May 13, 1988 
8 United Industrial Bank Ltd Allahabad Bank October 31, 1989 
9 Bank of Tamil Nadu Ltd Indian Overseas Bank February 20, 1990 
10 Bank of Thanjavur Ltd Indian Bank February 20, 1990 
11 Parur Central Bank Ltd Bank of India February 20, 1990 
12 Purvanchal Bank Ltd Central Bank of India August 29, 1990 
13 New Bank of India Punjab National Bank September 4, 1993 
14 Kashinath Seth Bank Ltd State Bank of India January 1, 1996 
15 Bari Doab Bank Ltd Oriental Bank of Commerce April 8, 1997 
16 Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd Oriental Bank of Commerce April 8, 1997 
17 Bareilly Corporation Bank Ltd Bank of Baroda June 3, 1999 
18 Sikkim Bank Ltd Union Bank of India December 22. 1999 
19 Times Bank Ltd HDFC Bank Ltd February 26, 2000 
20 Bank of Madura Ltd. ICICI Bank Ltd March 10, 2001 
21 ICICI Ltd ICIC I Bank Ltd May 3, 2002 
22 Benares State Bank Ltd Bank of Baroda June 20, 2002 
23 Nedungadi Bank Ltd Punjab National Bank February 1, 2003 
24 South Gujarat Local Area Bank Bank of Baroda June 25, 2004 
25 Global Trust Bank Ltd Oriental Bank of Commerce August 14, 2004 
26 IDBI Bank Ltd IDBI Ltd April 2, 2005 
27 Bank of Punjab Ltd Centurion Bank Ltd October 1, 2005 
28 Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad Ltd Federal Bank Ltd September 2, 2006 
29 United Western Bank Ltd IDBI Ltd October 3, 2006 
30 Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd Indian Overseas Bank March 31, 2007 
31 Sangli Bank Ltd ICICI Bank Ltd April 19, 2007 
32 Lord Krishna Bank Ltd Centurion Bank of Punjab Ltd August 29, 2007 
33 Centurion Bank of Punjab Ltd HDFC Bank Ltd May 23, 2008 
34 State Bank of Saurashtra State Bank of India August 13, 2008 
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35 State Bank of Indore State Bank of India June 19, 2009 
36 The Bank of Rajasthan ICICI Bank Ltd August 13, 2010 
37 ING Vysya Bank Kotak Mahindra Bank April 1, 2015 
Source: Author’s report compiled from Trends and progress of progress of banking in India, RBI, CMIE Prowess 
database and Economic times  
 
More and relevant data is available for the eighteenth-century India, which shows the 
development of banks in different parts of the country. The Indian Banking sector formally 
started with the initiation of the Bank of Hindustan set up in 1770 and later the General Bank of 
India in 1786. This was followed by the establishment of more banks across the country in the 
early nineteenth century, like that of the Bank of Calcutta in 1806, Bank of Bombay in 1840 and 
the Bank of Madras in 1843. Several other banks came in between like that of the Union Bank in 
1839, which failed to sustain itself and some like the Allahabad Bank in 1865, which is still 
continuing. The foreign banks started establishing in India as long back as the 1870s with the 
establishment of Comptoired’Escompte de Paris and HSBC, both in Bengal.  
Although, several banks came up during the pre-independence phase of India but mainly two 
factors affected the competition. Firstly, the banks were spread across the country, mostly in the 
eastern, western and the northern parts. Secondly, the unorganized sector was more thriving with 
a larger practice of unorganized lending and borrowing prevalent in those days. This created 
lesser competition in the banking sector during this phase. In the year 1881 one of the first ever 
documented acts, Negotiable Instrument Act (1881) which marks the commencement of 
regulation in the Indian Banking sector. The nation also experienced one of the earliest instances 
of the merger in 1921 when the Presidency Banks – Bank of Calcutta (then Bank of Bengal), 
Bank of Bombay and the Bank of Madras merged to form the Imperial Bank of India. From the 
very beginning of the nineteenth century, the country saw an exponential development of the 
banking sector. Many of the banks established during that period are still surviving, namely, the 
Bank of Baroda, Bank of India, Canara Bank, Central Bank of India, etc. The pre-independence 
period also saw the setting up of the Reserve Bank of India on the 1st of April, 1935 following 
the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. It was based on the recommendations of the Hilton-Young 
Commission or the Royal Commission of Indian Currency and Finance. Although, it was only 
after the independence of India, on the 1st of January, 1949, that RBI was nationalized. The time 
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of initiation was very crucial for India and rest of the world, as it was the recovery period from 
the Great Depression. The regulations at that point of time and the following decade was lenient, 
the lack of which lead a slow economy and low GDP growth during the aforementioned period. 
After independence, a series of steps were taken to shape the financial backbone of the country. 
This included The Banking Regulation Act (1949), The State Financial Corporations Act (1951), 
The Reserve Bank of India (Amendment and Misc. Provisions) Act (1953), The Industrial 
Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act (1955) among others. In Imperial Bank of India 
was renamed as the State Bank of India under The State Bank of India Act, 1955, which was 
followed by The State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act (1959). All these above were steps 
towards the reinforcement of the trade, commerce and economics backed by agriculture while 
banking being the enabler at every step.  
In the 1970s, soon after the attack, India went through a poor financial phase whichwas 
aggravated by poor utilization of resources, bad harvests, the capital crunch of the central 
government and lack of financing to the industries. This was further intensified by the burden of 
paying back the debt. In this gloomy scenario, the banking sector saw rapid changes from the 
very basic to the very depth of the industry.   In the two decades leading to 1969, the number of 
banks came down by more than eighty percent, although there was a substantial increase in the 
overall banking facility. The overall increase was stimulated due to the growth of the banking in 
some parts of the country only. Major portions of the country remained unbanked and under-
banked because of multiple reasons. The government looked for the establishment of the “social 
order” or “social control” in the banking sector and also to promote savings and credit behaviour 
in the rural parts of the country, which suffered due to the lack of information. As part of the 
steps to recover from the financial turmoil, the government took several steps in this sector, 
including tightening of regulations of the scheduled banks, modifying the credit policies. But the 
most important step in this direction in the post-independence and the pre-liberalization period 
was the nationalization of fourteen most important banks of the country, whose deposit exceeded 
rupees fifty crores. After the Emergency in the period of stabilization, the Government further 
took up the case of six more commercial Banks Under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and 
Transfer of Undertakings) Bill, these banks were nationalized in 1980, with the objective being – 
using large banks to achieve national objectives. This era saw a series of positives 
transformations and the expansion of banks with the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1973), 
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Reserve Bank of India (Amendment) Act, 1974 being passed and the Export-Import Bank being 
established. One of the major factors affecting the banking profitability and competition during 
this era was the high rates of inflation, which forced the RBI to implement high rates of SLR, 
CRR and Bank Rates. In fact, in 1985, the reserve cash in the form of SLR and CRR exceeded 
45% of the total deposits. In spite of this, the sector saw a high growth, mainly led by several 
schemes that were implemented including the Export Credit (Interest Subsidy) Scheme (1968), 
Lead Bank Scheme (!969), New Bills Rediscounting Scheme (1970), Differential Interest Rate 
Scheme (1972), Foreign Currency (Non-Resident) Account Scheme (1975), Duty Drawback 
credit scheme (1976), Neighbourhood Travel Scheme (NTS) (1981). This period saw a series of 
mergers and amalgamations, which consolidated the stronger counterparts. All the major 
consolidations that happened during that happened during this era followed the same pattern. 
State Bank of India amalgamated with Bank of Bihar (1969), National Bank of Lahore in 1970, a 
bank of Cochin (1985), thus increasing market share. The set of mergers also reduced 
competition among the local and nationalized banks.   
The crisis of bankruptcy and possible defaults on international payments in 1991 led to the 
Central Government devaluing the rupee in two stages and the introduction of the Liberalised 
Exchange Rate Management System or TERMS. The Government took steps to ensure that the 
high capital reserves as mandated by the RBI are decreased, and the strictness is regarding 
accounting standards, capital adequacy and income recognition norms. This also led to the 
licensing of private banks. The deregulations of lending rates for commercial banks were 
followed by the deregulation of interest rates on deposits. These were followed by high 
technological advancements and implementation of these technologies in the banking sector. 
Based on the guidelines issued by RBI in 1993, on the deregulation of entry barriers and 
restrictions of branching, eight new private sector banks made way in the banking sector of India 
during 1994-2001. This period not only saw a series of new entries of new private sector banks 
but also saw entries of foreign banks. The period under consideration, i.e. 2000-2014 saw not 
only entries of new banks but also saw the major consolidation of the sector.  
A major consolidation of the sector took place during this period. All major banks including 
State Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, and HDFC acquired other banks to increase the market 
share and obtain economies of scale. In the same period, the foreign banks also wanted to take 
advantage of the high-growth forecasts, which led to ANZ Grindlays Bank getting acquired by 
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Standard Chartered. The Narasimham Committee set up in 1998 stated in the report that mergers 
of banks with stronger banks are required and not with the weaker banks. Apart from the State 
Bank of India, ICICI Bank and HDFC Bank have been acquiring multiple banks in the past two 
decades. ICICI Bank acquired Bank of Madura Ltd (March 2001), ICICI Ltd (May 2002), Sangli 
Bank Ltd (April 2007), the Bank of Rajasthan in (August 2010). HDFC Bank acquired the Times 
Bank Ltd (February 2000) and the Centurion Bank of Punjab Ltd (May 2008). Most of the 
merger and acquisitions before the Narasimham Committee II report were driven by the weak 
financials of the acquired banks, whereas the quality of the banks regarding their financial health 
improved drastically post the report. Unlike the governments of the East Asian countries, where 
the regulators and the central government played an active role in the consolidation process. In 
India, the role was in the form of laying down the regulations and ensuring compliance with 
those regulations, which were formulated in the same lines as that of the international BASEL 
norms. Based on the suggestions of the Narasimham Committee II, the government rationalized 
the public sector banks before endorsing the privatization of the banks and passing the Financial 
Institutions Laws (Amendment) Bill in 2000. In 2002, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of 
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Ordinance were passed. This initiative was the 
way forward for the quicker recovery of the amounts provided in credits by the concerned bank.  
 
One of the reasons for the decrease in competition can be the higher requirements or norms for 
the BASEL II standardized norms. The other can be a consolidation of the sector, with the major 
banks acquiring smaller banks to gain economies of scale, market share and transaction volume.  
 
3. Previous Studies 
Various ideologies exist in the literature that contributes to the early empirical work on 
competition studies. The theory of competition is based on the assumption that markets are 
contestable, which implies that the firms can easily enter or leave the market without any barriers 
and that the potential firms operate at the same cost functions as the existing firms. 
The non-structural models Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982) and Panzar & Rosse (1987) are all 
resultants of the basic assumptions of profit-maximizing equilibrium established in the 
aforementioned models. This means that a market, which is contestable, will inherently be 
competitive (Baumal et al.1982). 
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Concentration ratios were initially used as a measure of competitive performance in the banking 
market. One of the early approaches was the Structure Conduct Hypothesis(SCP), based on the 
work by Bain, (1951) which indicates towards an inverse relationship between concentration and 
competition wherein banks often collude and indulge in price setting thereby reducing 
competition.SCP paradigm has been applied and tested in the banking industry to analyse market 
structure competition in banking. Market structure based on the traditional model is measured 
using the concentration ratio of top k banks. However,the contestability theory suggests that a 
concentrated banking industry can behave competitively if the hurdles for entry and exit are low. 
This theory asserts that the threat of potential entry forces banks with large market shares to price 
their products competitively under conditions like contestable markets. The other ideology was 
Efficient Structure Hypothesis(ESH) which also describes a positive relationship between 
concentration and competition. They differ in terms of reasons they provide for the positive 
relationship between the two (Demsetz, 1973).Many researchers have used concentration 
measure for the level of competition (Lloyd-Williams, et al .1994). Although there is evidence in 
support of these theories (Bikker & Haaf, 2002), nevertheless, it has been shown in the literature 
that concentration is an unreliable measure of competition (Shaffer, 1993,2002). 
It has been argued that there is no direct measure to assess the level of competition due to the 
absence of cost and prices of individual banking products. However, there are various indirect 
measures, which are both structural as well as non-structural in nature (Bikker, 2004). 
The New empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) framework estimates the various parameters 
of competition among firms, and these parameters are largely based on the microeconomic as 
well as price cost theories. It emerged as one of the major methods as it assumes that market 
structure is an endogenous factor and depends upon market characteristics as well as the 
premeditated and strategic behaviour of banks themselves. Under this framework, two models 
emerge – the Bresnahan (1982)& Lau (1982) approach and Panzar and Rosse model (1987). 
The Bresnahan (1982)& Lau(1982) model is based on simultaneous equation modelling which 
estimates demand and supply functions. Shaffer (1989, 1993), Coccorese (2004) and Bikker & 
Haaf (2002) particularly, have applied this test to banking markets. However, it requires 
extensive data which may not be available quite easily especially in the case of banks. The other 
method is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model, which require bank-specific data or firm level 
data and is popularly used in banking studies. It measures the competition by the level to which 
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any change in the input prices affects the revenues of a bank. The H-statistic is obtained, which 
can be interpreted for the presence of Monopoly, oligopoly or monopolistic competition. 
Shaffer (1989) uses this methodology to study the competitiveness among U.S. Banking Industry. 
He argues that banks behave neither as monopolists’ firms nor as perfectly competitive firms in 
long-run equilibrium. Nathan & Neave (1989) estimate the H-statistic from 1982-1984 and 
indicate the presence of perfect competition for 1982 and monopolistic competition for 1983 and 
1984. Various other studies which have indicated the presence of monopolistic competition are 
Hondroyiannis et al.(1999) for Greece, Belaisch (2003) for Brazil, Coccorese, (2004) for Italy, 
andRozas (2007) for Spain. Bikker & Haaf(2002) conclude that monopolistic competition is 
predominant for most of the countries out of the 120 countries which he has studied.Park, (2009) 
pointed out that in Korea, there was perfect competition during the crisis. Among the cross-
countrystudies, Bikker & Spierdijk (2008) studied that there is declining competition among the 
developed economies whereas competition is increasing for emerging-market economies. 
Yildirim & Philippatos (2007)conclude for the presence of Monopolistic competition among 11 
Latin American countries. Mensi (2010) also observed monopolistic competition for Tunisia. In 
a recent study, Sufian & Habibullah (2013) test for the effect of mergers on the change in the 
degree of competition in Malaysian Banking Industry using the Panzar-Rosse model and indicate 
towards a monopolistic competition. Generally, the results are consistent with the presence of 
monopolistic competition. However, monopoly has been rarely observed in some studies for 
Germany in 1986 as well as Italy for 1986-1987 by Molyneux et al.(1994). To assess the 
intensity and the nature of change in the competitive structure of the banking sector from 2000 to 
2014, we apply the Panzar-Rosse Model on reduced form revenue equations. We estimate both 
the static as well as the dynamic versions of the model with the variations as proposed by 
Goddard & Wilson, (2009), and deal with misspecification of PRH (Panzar-Rosse H-statistic) as 
pointed out by Bikker (2004) by estimating the static as well as dynamic models alternatively. 
Going forward, this section gives the background of the methodology that has been used. Section 
4 gives the analysis of the data that have been used. Section 5 gives the empirical evidence based 
on the data. Section 6 gives the analysis and interpretation of the empirical findings and finally 
relates to the current policy decisions. Section 7 concludes the research with the policy 
implications. 
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3.1 Theoretical Framework: Panzar-Rosse Model (PRH) 
John C. Panzar and James N. Rosse developed a statistic to test for the competitive conditions in 
a contestable market using reduced form revenue equations. This statistic could be precisely 
discriminate between oligopolistic, monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive 
banking markets, and may be considered as an overall assessment of the competitive conditions 
The foremost advantages of the Panzar-Rosse methodology over the other models are its 
efficiency with bank-specific or company-specific data, i.e., the input costs and the output 
revenues. It does not have any specific requirement for the equilibrium information – either 
company specific or industry specific. While the other models tend to provide a bias towards 
monopolistic competition, the Panzar-Rosse methodology works quite well with small samples. 
The assumptions in this method include that the firms can enter and exit the market freely 
without making substantial losses in the procedure, i.e., the absence of entry or exit barriers. It 
also assumes that the new entrants or the expected entrants operate at the same cost function as 
the traditional and well-established firms. In case the market is contestable, and if there is the 
threat of new entry with price cutting as the only differentiation, the established firms are forced 
to sell their products at the rate of marginal cost. So in the condition of market equilibrium, the 
established firms do not realize a super normal profit, and the new entrants do not enter due to 
the lack of profit making opportunity in the near term. 
The empirical test is based on the equilibrium model which determines the equilibrium output E 
by maximization of revenue or profits. Underlying this bank 𝑖 maximizes profits where marginal 
cost equals marginal revenue. For a single bank 𝑖 Total profit maximization equation will take 
the following form: 
𝑅𝑖
′(𝑦𝑖,, 𝑘, 𝑣𝑖) − 𝐶𝑖
′(𝑦𝑖, 𝑓𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖) = 0           Equation (1) 
Where 𝑅𝑖
′ is the marginal revenue function, 
𝐶𝑖
′is the marginal cost function, 
𝑦𝑖is the output of the bank, 
𝑘 is the number of banks, 
𝑣𝑖 and  𝑞𝑖  are the exogenous variables that shift the bank’s revenue and cost functions, 
respectively  
𝑓𝑖 is a vector of i
th bank’s 𝑚 factor input prices. 
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The second rule implying this would be that there would be a zero profit level constraint at the 
industry level, in that case, the profit equation takes the following functional form 
𝑅𝑖
∗(𝑦∗, 𝑘∗, 𝑣𝑖)– 𝐶𝑖
∗(𝑦∗, 𝑓𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖) = 0       Equation (2) 
Where 𝑅𝑖
∗, 𝐶𝑖
∗, 𝑦∗, 𝑘∗ represent equilibrium values of𝑅𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖 , 𝑦, 𝑘 respectively. 
Market power will be measured by the extent to which a change in the factor input prices 𝜕𝑓𝑖𝑥 is 
reflected in the equilibrium revenues 𝜕𝑅𝑖
∗ earned by the bank i. Panzar-Rosse describe H statistic 
as a sum of elasticities of the revenue function as below: 
                                  𝐻 =  ∑
𝜕𝑅𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑓𝑖𝑥
.
𝑅𝑖
∗
𝑓𝑖𝑥
𝑚
𝑥=1       Equation 
(3)The value of H will range between -∞ <H <1 
Therefore, H is the sum of factor price elasticity and it measures how the revenue of a bank 
changes with response to the percentage change in factor input prices. The main argument 
behind the model is that if a market is freely contestable then the potential entrants have the same 
cost effectiveness as the other incumbents already in the market. We implement the Panzar-
Rosse revenue test (1987) using bank-level panel data in the present study. 
 
Table 3 shows the interpretation of the Equilibrium and Competition Analysis 
 
The interpretation of H-statistic is clear and precise. The value of the estimated H-statistic ranges 
between negative infinity to one. Panzar and Rosse (1987) suggested that the value of H is equal 
to one for the market in perfect competition. This would imply that an increase in the factor of 
Equilibrium Analysis 
E = 0 Equilibrium 
E < 0 Disequilibrium 
  
Competitive Conditions 
H <= 0 Monopoly or conjectural variations short-run oligopoly 
0 < H < 1 Monopolistic Competition i 
H=1 Perfect competition or natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable 
market or sales maximizing ﬁrm subject to a break-even constraint 
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input price will increase the revenues proportionally. The H-statistic interpretation primarily lies 
in the fact that we measure variations in revenues with respect to input costs at the firm level. 
In the case of the monopolistic competition, the proportional increase in revenue is less as 
compared to the proportional increase in input prices, which may be due to the inelasticity of the 
demand function. Panzar and Rosse also show that if the long-run equilibrium assumption is 
valid, then the value of H may be equal to one in the case of perfect competition. This is 
accounted for due to the interaction of input prices and the reaction effect of the costs. An 
increase in the input prices of a bank may further result in an increase in marginal and average 
costs of a bank, and under the equilibrium assumption, it would not affect the maximum output 
of a bank. Consequently, this may result in walking out by many banks, which eventually led to 
an increase in the demand of the remaining banks in the market. This causes an overall increase 
in the revenues of the banking market indicating the presence of a perfect competition. Bikker & 
Haaf (2002) interpret the estimated value of the PRH statistic as a continuous measure of 
competition and suggest that larger values of H indicate an increasing degree of competition. The 
basic assumption underlying the model is the presence of long-run equilibrium.  
The application of this methodology on the banking sector also requires an additional assumption 
that the banks may be treated as single product firms providing intermediary services (Bandt 
&Davis, 2000).The estimation of H statistic can be obtained by transforming the Panzar-Rosse 
Model into the following econometric specification: 
 
ln 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇0 + ∑ 𝜇𝑎 ln 𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑎′
𝑎=1  + ∑ 𝜌𝑏 ln 𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝑏′
𝑏=1 + ∑ 𝜎𝑐 ln 𝑍𝑐𝑡
𝑐′
𝑐=1  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  Equation (4) 
            
where , 
𝑃𝑖𝑡  represents revenue of  the i th bank at time t 
𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 of the i th bank at time t 
𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
′𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒  
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
𝑍𝑐𝑡 vector represents the vector of macroeconomic factors 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚,  
also, 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖          Equation (4.1) 
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𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘‐ 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 
𝑣𝑖  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 
 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝜇𝑎
𝑎′
𝑎=1 = 0 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔‐ 𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑢𝑚      Equation (4.2) 
𝐻 = ∑ 𝜌𝑏
𝑏′
𝑏=1  𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     Equation (4.3) 
 
Specifically, the estimation of the equilibrium condition is done by estimating the following 
equation: 
ln 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2 ln 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 ln 𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1 ln 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽3 ln 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡        Equation (5) 
Where, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐸𝐸 =  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 
𝐶𝐹 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐼𝐿 =  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 
𝑃𝐴 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
𝑇𝐴 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐶𝐴 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟’𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
In a dynamic framework, the equation (5) will include a lagged dependent variable as an 
independent variable as given below: 
 
ln 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿 ln 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼1 ln 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2 ln 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 ln 𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1 ln 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽2 ln 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 ln 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡      Equation (6) 
The equilibrium condition can be tested by taking the sum of the coefficients, 𝛼1  ,𝛼2,  𝛼3  of 
Equation (6), 
𝐸 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 and using the following hypothesis:    Equation (7) 
𝐻0 ∶ 𝐸 = 0 ⇒ There is equilibrium 
𝐻1 ∶ 𝐸 ≠ 0  ⇒ There is no equilibrium 
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If the above condition of equilibrium is satisfied, the estimation of H statistic can be done by the 
following equation taking revenue as a dependent variable: 
 
ln 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼′0 + 𝛼′1 ln 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼′2 ln 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼′3 ln 𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽′1 ln 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′2 ln 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽′3 ln 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 +   𝛾′𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀
′
𝑖𝑡       
 Equation (8) 
where  𝑇𝑅 =  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒. 
In a dynamic framework, the above equation (8) will include a lagged dependent variable as an 
independent variable given below: 
 
ln 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼′0 + 𝛿
′ln 𝑇𝑅𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼′1 ln 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼′2 ln 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼′3 ln 𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽′1 ln 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽′2 ln 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽′3 ln 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾′𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀′𝑖𝑡Equation (9)  
The H-statistic, a measure of degree of competition, is the sum of the coefficients, 𝛼′1, 𝛼′2, 𝛼′3 of 
Equation (8), 𝐻 = 𝛼′1 + 𝛼′2 + 𝛼′3  
To measure the level of competition bank’s core business activity, we take interest revenue as a 
dependent variable in the following equation:       
 
ln 𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼′′0 + 𝛼′′1 ln 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼′′2 ln 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼′′3 ln 𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽′′1 ln 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′′2 ln 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽′′3 ln 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾′′𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀
′′
𝑖𝑡,       Equation (10) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑅 =  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒. 
 
In a dynamic framework, the above equation(10) will include a lagged dependent variable as an 
independent variable given below: 
 
ln 𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼′′0 + 𝛿
′′ ln 𝐼𝑅𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼′′1 ln 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼′′2 ln 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼′′3 ln 𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′′1 ln 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽′′2 ln 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′′3 ln 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾′′𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀
′′
𝑖𝑡     Equation (11) 
 
We estimate the above the equations ((5) to (11)) using fixed effect as well as dynamic panel 
estimations in the present study. 
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3.2 Misspecification of Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic (PRH) 
We deal with two misspecifications of the PRH statistic. It was pointed out by Goddard (2009) 
that when the adjustment towards equilibrium is partial and not instantaneous, the estimation of 
H statistic with fixed effects produces results which are biased towards zero. Consequently, the 
bias implies an incorrect identification of the competition structure of the market. The partial 
adjustment requires the inclusion of lagged dependent variable among the independent factors of 
the revenue equation. The dynamic estimation of the revenue equation will help in the 
assessment of the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium through estimated value of the 
coefficient of lagged dependent variable. It is formulated that in case we do not consider the 
dynamics of the PRH equations and if Total Revenue is actually dependent upon its past or 
lagged values, then it would create a pattern of autocorrelation in the disturbance terms. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and𝑢𝑖 
This will render Fixed effect or Random effects estimations biased and the inferences drawn 
about the degree of competition will be incorrect, especially when time period under 
consideration is small. Then there also exists a need for the estimation of dynamic models to 
observe the persistence of profit. Goddard et al, (2004) conclude that the convergence towards 
equilibrium in the long run is partial and not instantaneous. This evidence is documented by 
Goddard et al.(2004) and Berger et al.(2000) using non parametric techniques. We therefore have 
enough evidence to use the dynamic model for the estimation of the H-statistic. In view of the 
above criticism of the static model, we estimate a dynamic model by specifically including a 
lagged dependent variable among the independent factors. We remove the bank specific effects 
by differencing the Equation no 4.The suggested dynamics will lead the equation (4) to take the 
following form after first differencing it: 
ln ∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ln ∆𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜇𝑎 ln ∆𝑋𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑎′
𝑎=1  + ∑ 𝜌𝑏 ln∆ 𝑌𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝑏′
𝑏=1 + ∑ 𝜎𝑐𝑍𝑐𝑡
𝑐′
𝑐=1  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 Equation (12) 
 
And the corresponding H statistic for the dynamic model will be obtained by: 
H=
∑ μa
𝑎′
𝑎=1
1-λ
          Equation (13) 
To control for the endogeneity bias, we use lagged variables as instruments in the differenced 
equation, as by construction they are correlated with the differenced error terms. To account for 
such endogeneity bias, Goddard & Wilson, (2009) and Olivero et al. (2011) use the difference 
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GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), where lagged level of endogenous 
variables are used as instruments in the differenced equation.  
The second misspecification was pointed out by Bikker et al.(2006) for the use of scaled value of 
revenue or the dependent variable in the revenue equation which results in a systematic 
overestimation of the PRH statistic. According to the author, the use of scaled dependent variable 
changes the form of a revenue equation to a profit equation resulting in estimates of H-statistic 
biased towards one. Bikker & Spierdijk (2008) were the first to calculate the correctly specified 
H-statistic for a Panel of 101 countries for 15 years. 
Figure 1 Time Series showing Ratio of Annual Interest Expenses to Total Loanable Funds (IE)
 
We, therefore, account for the misspecification in the PRH statistic developed by Panzar and 
Rosse (1987) and compare the static Fixed effect estimation with the dynamic panel data model 
given by Arellano and Bond(1991), as specified by Goddard(2009). We also use unscaled values 
of the dependent variable in the revenue equations as indicated by (Bikker et al. 2006).  
 
Data 
We use bank-level data for 68 Public,Private as well as foreign banks over a period of fifteen 
years from 2000 to 2014 resulting in an unbalanced panel with 933 bank-year observations. Data 
has been extracted from Ace Equity, CMIE Prowess and RBI reports (A Profile of Banks). 
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Figure 2 Time Series showing Ratio of Employee Expenses to number of Employees (EE)
 
 
Figure 3 Time Series showing Ratio of Capital Expenses to Fixed Assets(CF)
 
The graphs in figure 1, 2 and 3 show the gradual change of the three input price variables across 
the time- period from 2000-2014.  
Table 4 shows the Description of Dependent and Independent Factors used in the study 
Dependent Variables 
Return-on-Assets (ROA) The ratio of after-tax Profits to Total Assets. 
Total-Revenue(TR) Total Income, i.e., the sum of Interest Income and Non-Interest Income. 
Interest-Income(IR) Total Income from Interest Earning activities. 
Input Prices -Independent Variables 
Capital expenditure- to- The ratio of Capital Expenses to Fixed Assets. It represents theunit cost 
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Fixed Asset (CF) of capital. 
Interest Expenses-to-
Loans (IL) 
The ratio of Annual Interest Expenses to Total Loanable Funds which is 
Deposits plus borrowings. It represents the unit cost of funds. 
Employee-Expenses 
(EE) 
The ratio of Employee Expenses to the number of Employees. It 
represents the unit cost of labour. 
Control Variables 
Total Assets (TA) It is taken as a proxy for size. 
Capital-to-Asset (CA) The ratio of Sum of Shareholder’s Capital and Reserves to Total Assets. 
NPA-to-Asset (PA) The ratio of Net Provisions for Non-Performing Assets to Total Asset. 
This is used as a proxy for credit risk. 
Macro-Economic Variable 
GDP Gross Domestic Production Growth Rate 
 
The table (correlations) demonstrates the cross correlations among all the independent variables. 
We observe that none of the independent factors show a correlation greater than 0.80 or 80% and 
VIF of independent variables less than 5,which implies that the problem of multicollinearity does 
not exist for our chosen independent factors. 
Table 5 shows the Cross Correlation Matrix of Independent Factors 
 
EE CF IL RISK TA CA GDP 
EE 1 ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ 
CF -0.093 1 ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ 
IL 0.066 -0.001 1 ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ 
RISK -0.238 0.040 0.098 1 ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ 
TA 0.210 -0.111 0.083 -0.076 1 ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ 
CA 0.251 0.066 -0.247 -0.114 -0.398 1 ̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶̶ 
GDP 0.099 -0.125 -0.178 -0.013 0.092 0.070 1 
EE= Ratio of Employee Expenses to number of Employees, CF=Ratio of Capital Expenses to Fixed 
Assets, IL= Ratio of Annual Interest Expenses to Total Loanable Funds, PA=Ratio of Net Provisions for 
Non-Performing Assets to Total Asset, TA=Total Assets, Risk = Loan loss provisions to total assets, 
CA=Ratio of Sum of Shareholder’s Capital and Reserves to Total Assets, GDP=GDP Growth Rate 
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Table 6 shows the Descriptive statistics of Independent Factors 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
EE 0.18 0.04 91.36 0.01 2.99 926 
CF 0.43 0.18 55.13 0.03 2.31 859 
IL 0.08 0.06 6.95 0.03 0.25 925 
RISK 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.05 0.01 886 
TA 71755.72 24923.18 1792748.29 2312.00 143610.45 930 
CA 0.09 0.06 0.98 0.00 0.09 930 
GDP 7.04 7.42 10.26 3.80 2.18 933 
EE= Ratio of Employee Expenses to number of Employees, CF=Ratio of Capital Expenses to Fixed 
Assets, IL= Ratio of Annual Interest Expenses to Total Loanable Funds, PA=Ratio of Net Provisions for 
Non-Performing Assets to Total Asset, TA=Total Assets, Risk = Loan loss provisions to total assets, 
CA=Ratio of Sum of Shareholder’s Capital and Reserves to Total Assets, GDP=GDP Growth Rate 
 
The descriptive statistics of the independent factors show that there are major differences among 
banks specifically with respect to employee wages, salary and the cost of deposits. This 
highlights the heterogeneity among banks with respect to the bank-specific factors. 
5. Empirical Findings and Analysis 
Since the Panzar-Rosse model is applicable under the equilibrium conditions only, we first test 
for the existence of Equilibrium Conditions over the full period as well as for rolling sample of 
sub-periods extending for five years each. It also helps in identifying the phases or stretches of 
disequilibrium in the sub-periods of analysis. The table (ROA Rolling) analyses the complete 
period as well as all the five-year long sub-periods in the given time period. Analysis for the 
equilibrium test is done based on the rolling data sample with the dependent variable being 
Return on Assets, to comprehend the shift or transition of the equilibrium conditions along the 
years. We calculate the value of E or the equilibrium test. It can be mathematically determined 
by the following formula: 
𝐸 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 +  𝜇3  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 
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𝜇1 = 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠(𝐸𝐸)  
𝜇2 = 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝐶𝐹)  
 𝜇3 =  𝐶𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 (𝐼𝐿)   
 
The validity of PRH statistic depends upon the assumption of long-run market equilibrium which 
we have tested in the table (table 5). We check whether the value of E or sum of the values of 
𝛼1, 𝛼2 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝛼3is equal to zero or not. We conduct the Wald test for the total period as well as the 
sub periods putting by testing the following null and alternate hypothesis: 
𝐻0 ∶ 𝐸 = 0 
𝐻1 ∶ 𝐸 ≠ 0 
The table also shows the values of the estimated coefficients and the value of F-statistic along 
with its level of significance. The results in the table show that from the period 2000 – 2014, the 
banking industry is in near equilibrium condition in the long run. The Wald test fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that E=0.The data for the sub-period shows near zero values of E which points 
towards the equilibrium conditions. The result for the sub-periods, which includes the recession 
years, shows empirical evidence of the presence of disequilibrium in the banking industry in the 
short run. The F-statistic also sustains at a higher level during this period with lower levels of 
significance which indicates a deviation from the equilibrium condition. This period of 
disequilibrium corresponds to the period of the global financial crisis. 
The results of the dynamic panel, as well as fixed effect models, are presented and compared in 
Table 7.Alternative estimations are also done to find the robustness of the results in the case of 
un-scaled revenue and scaled revenue equation.  
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Table 7 shows the Tests of Equilibrium (Rolling Sample) in Return on Assets 
EE= Ratio of Employee Expenses to number of Employees, CF=Ratio of Capital Expenses to Fixed Assets, IL= 
Ratio of Annual Interest Expenses to Total Loanable  
*,**,*** denote the rejection of null hypothesis at 10%,5%,1% respectively 
 
The banks in the sample are found to be earning their revenues as if under monopolistic 
competition as in many other emerging market economies.Monopolistic competition is a type of 
imperfect competition such that many producers sell products that are differentiated from one 
another as goods but are not perfect substitutes.  In monopolistic competition, the firm takes the 
prices charged by its rivals and ignores the impact of its own prices on the prices of other firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period ln EE (𝜶𝟏) ln CF(𝜶𝟐) ln IL  (𝜶𝟑) Sum (E) F-Statistic(Wald test) 
2000-2014 0.0635 -0.0176 -0.0745 -0.0286 F(1,785) = 0.1842 
2000-2004 -0.0584 -0.0001 -0.1389 -0.1975 F(1,199) = 2.9606* 
2001-2005 -0.0053 -0.0075 -0.0057 -0.0186 F(1,206) = 0.0211 
2002-2006 -0.1158 0.0573 0.1103 0.0518 F(1,214) = 0.1617 
2003-2007 0.0987 -0.0137 -0.1007 -0.0158 F(1,220) = 0.0154 
2004-2008 0.3723 -0.0234 -0.1007 0.2482 F(1,225) = 2.5584 
2005-2009 1.2682 0.0389 -0.0620 1.2451 F(1,230) = 22.6652*** 
2006-2010 0.5149 0.0841 -0.0488 0.5502 F(1,234) = 5.3125** 
2007-2011 0.3159 0.0822 -0.1898 0.2083 F(1,231) = 1.2618 
2008-2012 0.0901 0.0540 -0.2425 -0.0984 F(1,227) = 0.2601 
2009-2013 -0.0633 0.0611 -0.2834 -0.2856 F(1,224) = 2.4904 
2010-2014 -0.0503 0.0009 0.0029 -0.0465 F(1,221) = 0.1751 
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Table 8 shows the Fixed Effect and Dynamic Estimation of Total Revenue 
 
EE= Ratio of Employee Expenses to number of Employees, CF=Ratio of Capital Expenses to Fixed 
Assets, IL= Ratio of Annual Interest Expenses to Total Loanable Funds, Risk=Ratio of Net Provisions for 
Non-Performing Assets to Total Asset, Size= Natural Logarithm of Total Assets, Capital Ratio=Ratio of 
Sum of Shareholder’s Capital and Reserves to Total Assets, GDP=GDP Growth Rate 
Null 1= There is monopoly (H0: H=0), Null 2= There is perfect competition (H0: H=1) 
‘*’,’**’,’***’ denote significance at 10%,5% and 1% respectively. 
‘a’,’b’,’c’ denote rejection of null hypothesis at 10%,5% and 1% respectively. 
Note: J-Statistic-The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation. 
AR(1)Arellano-Bond test that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0 implies no 
autocorrelation).AR(2) Arellano-Bond test that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0 implies no 
autocorrelation). 
 (TR) Dynamic Model Fixed Effect Model 
 2000-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 
Ln (TR(-1)) 0.326*** 0.376*** 0.083*** -  -      -  
Constant -0.009 0.001 0.011*** -0.886*** 0.001 -1.797*** 
Ln (EE) 0.015*** -0.074*** 0.007* 0.014 -0.020 0.003 
Ln (CF) 0.031*** 0.053*** 0.011 0.001 0.009 -0.018 
Ln (IL) 0.106*** 0.284*** 0.044*** 0.132*** 0.177*** 0.078*** 
Risk 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.011* 0.018 0.019** 
Size 0.623*** 0.576*** 0.894*** 0.924*** 0.834*** 0.037 
Capital Ratio 0.089*** 0.074*** 0.145*** 0.040* 0.050* 0.288*** 
GDP 0.015*** 0.001* 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.012* 0.001 
H-Statistic 0.230 0.424 0.069 0.147 0.166 0.063 
Number of 
Observations 
786 356 304 924 492 432 
AR(1) 0.110 0.065 0.197 - - - 
AR(2) 0.195 0.755 0.301 - - - 
Hansen J test(p-
value)/Adj. R2      
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
62.408 57.965 60.578 0.981 0.980 0.633 
Null1 1: H=0 
 
F(1,778) = F(1,348) = F(1,296) = F(1,849) = F (1,418) = F (1,360) = 
 1014.429c 3113.936c 53.868c 24.117c 9.951c 4.561c 
Null 2: H=1 F(1,778) = F(1,348) = F(1,296) = F(1,849) = F (1,418) = F (1,360) = 
 12082.870c 5662.362c 6466.536c 808.030c 249.781c 1004.003c 
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The results also support the finding that when the adjustment towards the equilibrium is partial 
and not instantaneous, the H-statistic is downward biased (Goddard and Wilson,2010).This is 
clearly evident from the relatively higher values of H-statistic in the case of dynamic estimations 
as compared to fixed effect estimations. Results show a negative first order autocorrelation in the 
errors, but this does not imply inconsistency in the results. Inconsistency would be implied if 
second order autocorrelation is present (Arellano and Bond,1990).  
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Table 9 shows the Fixed Effect and Dynamic Estimation of Interest Revenue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EE= Ratio of Employee Expenses to number of Employees, CF=Ratio of Capital Expenses to Fixed 
Assets, IL= Ratio of Annual Interest Expenses to Total Loanable Funds, Risk=Ratio of Net Provisions for 
Non-Performing Assets to Total Asset, Size= Natural Logarithm of Total Assets, Capital Ratio=Ratio of 
Sum of Shareholder’s Capital and Reserves to Total Assets, GDP=GDP Growth Rate 
Null 1= There is monopoly (H0: H=0), Null 2= There is perfect competition (H0: H=1) 
‘*’,’**’,’***’ denote significance at 10%,5% and 1% respectively. 
‘a’,’b’,’c’ denote rejection of null hypothesis at 10%,5% and 1% respectively. 
Note: J-Statistic-The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation. 
AR(1)Arellano-Bond test that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0 implies no 
autocorrelation).AR(2) Arellano-Bond test that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0 implies no 
autocorrelation). 
 
Dynamic Model Fixed Effect Model 
 
2000-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 
Ln (IR(-1)) 0.256*** 0.192*** 0.126*** -  -      -  
Constant -0.019*** -0.057***   -0.008***   -3.187*** -2.194*** -2.403*** 
Ln (EE) -0.006** 0.0155*** 0.031** -0.031 -0.074 0.003 
Ln (CF) 0.054*** 0.090*** 0.012*** 0.018 0.030* -0.002 
Ln (IL) 0.124*** 0.503*** 0.085*** 0.116*** 0.210*** 0.089*** 
Risk -0.003*** -0.005 0.001*** -0.004 -0.001 0.012 
Size 0.914*** 0.801*** 0.913*** 1.077*** 0.969*** 1.075*** 
Capital ratio -0.008 -0.054*** 0.225*** -0.064** -0.089** 0.281*** 
GDP 0.013*** 0.031*** -0.011*** 0.025*** 0.010 0.001 
H-value 0.232 0.754 0.148 0.103 0.167 0.090 
Number of 
Observations 786 356 304 924 492 432 
Number of Banks 67 65 63 68 67 65 
AR(1) 0.103 0.066 0.855 - - - 
AR(2) 0.402 0.991 0.228 - - - 
Hansen J test( p-  
value)/Adj. R2 
 0.183 0.270 0.293 0.979 0.970 0.991 
H0: H=0 F (1,778) = F (1, 348) = F (296) =  F (1,849) = F (1,418) = F (1,360) = 
 
631.552c 10961.866c 172.036c 8.821c 5.471b 7.814c 
 
(25.131) (104.699) (13.116) (2.970) (2.339) (-2.795) 
H0: H=1 F (1,778) = F (1, 348) = F (296) =  F (1,849) = F (1,418) = F (1,360) = 
 9608.959c 505.010c 6699.872c 663.613c 136.412c 795.597c 
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Table 10: shows the Fixed Effect and Dynamic Estimations with dependent total revenue scaled 
by total assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EE= Ratio of Employee Expenses to number of Employees, CF=Ratio of Capital Expenses to Fixed 
Assets, IL= Ratio of Annual Interest Expenses to Total Loanable Funds, Risk=Ratio of Net Provisions for 
Non-Performing Assets to Total Asset, Size= Natural Logarithm  of Total Assets, Capital Ratio=Ratio of 
Sum of Shareholder’s Capital and Reserves to Total Assets, GDP=GDP Growth Rate 
Null 1= There is monopoly (H0: H=0), Null 2= There is perfect competition (H0: H=1) 
‘*’,’**’,’***’ denote significance at 10%,5% and 1% respectively. 
‘a’,’b’,’c’ denote rejection of null hypothesis at 10%,5% and 1% respectively. 
Note: J-Statistic-The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation. 
AR(1)Arellano-Bond test that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0 implies no 
autocorrelation).AR(2) Arellano-Bond test that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0 implies no 
autocorrelation). 
 Dynamic Model Fixed Effect Model 
 2000-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 2000-2014 2000-2007 2008-2014 
Ln (TR_TA(-1)) 0.340*** 0.180*** 0.042*** - - - 
Constant 0.005*** 0.0151**                  0.0178***                                                                                                                                                                              -0.057 1.509*** -1.797***
Ln (EE) 0.104*** 0.237*** 0.0311*** 0.110*** 0.197*** 0.003 
Ln (CF) 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.002 0.018* 0.025* -0.018 
Ln (IL) 0.167*** 0.416*** 0.062*** 0.193*** 0.260*** 0.078*** 
Risk 0.001 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.009 0.013 0.019** 
Size 0.104*** 0.289*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.229*** 0.037 
Capital Ratio 0.011** 0.003 0.151*** 0.022 0.033 0.288*** 
GDP 0.014** 0.006 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.012 0.001 
H-value 0.448 0.820 0.099 0.321 0.482 0.063 
Number of 
Observations 
784 363 304 915 495 432 
AR(1) 0.0289 0.022 0.223 - - - 
AR(2) 0.2623 0.502 0.297 - - - 
Hansen J test(p- 
value) 
0.302 0.355 0.274 0.493 0.686 0.633 
H0: H=0 F (1,776) =  F (1,355) =  F (1,296) = F(1,839) = F (1,421) = F(1,360) 
 16192.941c 69545.944c 538.476c 140.961c 165.754c 4.561b 
H0: H=1 F (1,776) =  F (1,355) =  F (1,296) = F(1,839) = F (1,421) = F(1,360) 
 23557.235c 3570.425c 22926.825c (632.401) 191.222c 1004.003b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
The presence second order autocorrelation is checked to substantiate whether there is 
inconsistency or not. We find that the second order autocorrelation is insignificant, which 
implies that there is no inconsistency in the results. Hansen J test shows a case of no over-
identifying restrictions and the model seems to be valid in the present context. 
Above table 7 exhibits the individual values of the coefficients of each of the independent 
variables for the complete period, and two sub-periods, which divides the complete term equally 
into two sub-periods. The value of H statistic for the full sample period is 0.230. The rejection of 
null hypothesis for H is equal to unity as well as zero, which leads to the rejection of the model 
for monopoly conjectural variations to short run oligopoly, and perfect competition for both the 
sub-periods, as well as for the entire period. Results indicate that revenues are earned as if under 
monopolistic competition as per the Panzar-Rosse Model. The value of the H statistic for the 
sub-periods 2000-2007 and 2008-2014 points towards a decrease in the degree of competition 
between the two sub-periods. Specifically in the post-recession period, government control and 
regulations increased which may have led to a decline in the degree of competition. One of the 
reasons for the decrease in competition can be the higher requirements or norms for the BASEL 
II standardized norms.Deregulation in the 1990’s increased the opening up of financial markets. 
This also served as an important constituent to increase the competitiveness of banking markets 
in the first sub-period of the study.The fall in the level of H statistic may be attributed to the 
consolidation of the sector, with the major banks acquiring smaller banks to gain economies of 
scale, market share and transaction volume.   Competition comes not just from foreign banks but 
also from the markets. With the growth of derivative transactions and financial markets, 
corporate and big houses may choose their sources of finance from various banking and non-
banking agencies. Even the individuals may park their funds in deposit accounts, and also will be 
able to choose from money market mutual funds other financial instruments.Nevertheless, even 
during the post-reform period revenues were earned as if under monopolistic competition. 
The coefficient value of lagged dependent variable of total revenue shows that the adjustment 
towards equilibrium is partial and not instantaneous.The unit price of labour and unit price of 
capital are all positively significant, however, the results consistently indicate that Interest 
expenses to total loans which are the unit price of funds significantly are the biggest contributor 
to the value of H-statistic in both static and dynamic model. This is a strong indicator of the 
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effects of interest rate liberalisation. The price of capital and price of labour are significant and 
positive for all the sub-periods as well as the full period sample. With respect to the control 
variables, capital to asset ratio is significant and positive. This confirms to the BASEL II 
guidelines wherein banks having higher access to available equity capital may achieve higher 
growth. So in this case, it implies increased revenue. Size of the banks or the total asset value has 
a positive and significant impact thus indicating that larger banks fetch higher revenues due to an 
increased market power. The variable of credit risk is positively significant, which lends support 
to the view that higher risk may lead to higher revenues. With regard to the macroeconomic 
factors, the effect of GDP is positive and statistically significant. This highlights the effect of 
business cycles on the revenue generation. 
Considering bank’s core business of interest generation, which have been banks traditional 
business activity for many years, we use the natural logarithm of interest revenue (table interest 
revenue) to estimate PRH statistic pertaining to banks' core business as well. In a similar manner, 
we find estimates of H-statistic downward biased in case of Fixed Effect estimation leading to 
higher values of H-statistic. We find that in the line of banks, traditional business activity interest 
revenues are earned as if under monopolistic competition. The value of H-statistic is higher for 
the first sub-period than the second sub-period as well as the whole sample. This mainly pertains 
to the fact that the early part of the sample period was marked by an increase in a number of 
foreign banks due to liberalised entry norms as well setting up of new private sector banks, 
which then began competing with the public sector banks for market share and earn income 
specifically pertaining to interesting generation activity. This lead to an increase in competition 
as measured by the PRH statistic. In the case of interest revenue, the highest contributing factor 
to H statistic is interest expenses. The unit cost of labour is negatively and statistically significant 
while the effect of the unit cost of deposits is positive at any given conventional level of 
significance.  
Following the steps of (Misspecifications of PRH), we also estimate the fixed effect and GMM 
estimations of total revenue scaled by the total asset. Based on the regression analysis, we reject 
the null hypothesis for both the cases where H-statistic is equal to zero, hence rejecting the fact 
that the industry has monopoly type of competition, and H-statistic is equal to one, hence 
rejecting the fact that the industry has perfect competition. Both the unit cost of labour and the 
unit cost of funds have a significant contribution to H-statistic. 
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The profit equation points out that the elimination of profits is partial and not instantaneous (the 
significant value of lagged variable of profit in the profit equation). Although the low persistence 
of profit values(in the sub-periods), are generally associated with higher competition,  but in the 
case of the Indian banking sector, it may not be implausible to think that a low persistence of 
profit may arise from other sources, than only competition. Persistence of profits may be a result 
of incumbent firms enjoying their market power or dominance. As a future scope, we need to 
map the competitive dynamics of the industry which include the entry threat and market 
contestability factors.  
Figure 4 
 
Source: Based on Author’s own calculations, based on total assets of the individual banks as compared to the 
market as a whole 
 
Based on the H-statistic obtained (Table 7, 8), we obtain the information that the revenues are 
earned under monopolistic competition, and the two sub samples also show a decline in 
competitive levels. However, the figure above shows a decline in the market concentration of top 
few banks which would imply an increase in competition according to the classical approach. 
Table 1 shows by the concentration index (CR 5 and CR 10) and H statistic values (Table 1). 
Conventional views on the relation between competition and market structure such as the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain,1951)) would suggest that more concentrated 
markets tend to be more collusive (lesser competitive). 
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 The results for concentration values and H-statistic values show that the overall market 
concentration also does not coincide with competitive conduct as measured by PRH statistic. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Panzar-RosseMethodology, using a reduced form revenue model in a dynamic framework and 
static framework, is used to assess the level and the nature of competition in the Indian Banking 
Industry.Our study is pivotal to the study of competition in the post-deregulation era, as this era 
also covers key changes regarding policy formulations on increasing the contestability of the 
markets. These policy formulations, firstly, culminated in a number of banking mergers and 
consolidations and various structural changes in the system as well. The hypotheses of perfect 
collusion as well as of perfect competition can be rejectedusing dynamic as well as fixed panel-
econometric estimations using the micro data of banks’ balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts for the years 2000-2014. The banks in India are found to be earning their revenues as if 
under monopolistic competition, as in many other emerging-market  economies. This implies 
that there may be few large banks which may be controlling the market and offer similar but not 
identical products. The results are consistent with other studies in the case of India and other 
emerging economies. 
The results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, in both fixed effect as well as a 
dynamic framework. The results are also supported by traditional business activities (interest 
income versusand non-interest income). We particularly test for the presence of equilibrium 
using ROA as the dependent factor in a rolling sample analysis and three different sample 
periods. Fixed effect estimations point towards the presence of equilibrium in the long run, 
however, the dynamic estimations (GMM)show disequilibrium. To account for various 
misspecification in the Panzar-RosseH statistic, pointed out in earlier studies, we estimate the 
model alternatively using fixed effect as well as dynamic estimations through the Arellano 
Bond(1991) Generalised Method of Moments. Dynamic empirical investigations of the Panzar-
Rosse Model are done to compare dynamic H statistic with static H statistic. Although the results 
confirm the downward bias of the H statistic, the presence of monopolistic competition cannot be 
ruled out.The division of the entire sample into two sub-period before 2007 and after 2007 shows 
a decrease in the level of competition between the two-sample  periods. Among the factors which 
contribute to total revenue positively and significantly include the unit cost of labour, funds and 
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capital, out of which unit cost of funds is the highest contributing factor towards the H-statistic. 
The effect of Credit risk on revenue is significant and positive, which points towards higher risk 
to realize higher revenues. To assess the nature of competition in the core business activity of 
banks, we re-estimate the Panzar-RosseEquation with interest revenue as a dependent variable 
which also indicated towards monopolistic competition as well. 
Although, the concentration ratio of top five and top ten banks has decreased across the years, 
which implies an increase in competitive conduct according to the classical theory and Structure 
Conduct Performance(SCP) hypothesis. This shows that the competitive conduct does not 
coincide with the concentration index in the case of Indian Banks. We have also seen that the 
competition has also decreased across the time-periods. Deregulation in the 1990’s increased the 
opening up of financial markets.This also served as an important constituent to increase the 
competitiveness of banking markets in the first sub-period of the study.Even though there has 
been a decrease in the dominance of a few large banks, the competitiveness of commercial 
bankshas been threateneddue to the barriers to entry, consolidation exercises and over 
regulation.This may have hindered the high degree of competitiveness of the market. The 
movement of bank activities from traditional financial business to off-balance sheet activities 
might have led to convergence in the competitive levels. The empirical analysis provides support 
to the assumption that the structure of Indian Banking sector remains to be monopolistic 
competition even though the consolidation exercises have been on the forefront in the last few 
years. This feature of the Indian Banking market is consistent with other emerging-market  
economies or developing countries. However, the regulator needs to address the issue of any 
cartel formations by bigger banks to capture market share and business volume. The talks of the 
merger of six important banks to form two banks, the mergers of stronger banks with smaller 
banks, will further decrease competition. 
As a policy implication; the study also highlights the possible link between banking sector 
competitiveness, profitability, financial intermediation and regulatory impact. Although the low 
persistence of profit values(in the sub-periods) are associated with higher competition, in the 
case of the Indian banking sector, it may be possible to outline that a low persistence of profit 
may arise from other sources than only competition. Persistence of profits may be a result of 
incumbent firms enjoying their market power or dominance.  
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As a future scope, we need to map the competitive dynamics of the industry which include the 
entry threat and market contestability factors.  
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